After the heavily choreographed May 9 parade in Moscow, Vladimir Putin declared that the war in Ukraine is close to ending and that he is ready to negotiate a new European security architecture. But he picked his partner: Gerhard Schröder, the former German chancellor.

"I think the thing is coming to an end," Putin said. And in the same speech he added: "For months Russia has been waiting to suffer a catastrophic defeat." The rhetoric is triumphant, even if the reality on the ground is different - Russian forces hold roughly one fifth of Ukrainian territory, nowhere near the goal Moscow announced in 2022.

On the negotiating partner: "Personally, I prefer the former chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Schröder." The pick is anything but accidental. Schröder has decades of business ties to Russian energy companies - Gazprom, Rosneft, Nord Stream. As a potential negotiator he would not represent European interests, he would serve as a "European" voice for Russian ones.

A three-day ceasefire from May 9 to 11 was declared. Both sides immediately accused each other of breaching it. A Balkan reader recognises the script - ceasefire, peace rhetoric, military operations carrying on. The Balkans of the 1990s ran the exact same play. And Schröder as a "European" voice for Russia? That is a move Moscow already tried in 2014. It didn't work then. Why would it work now?