The Malian junta that controls Bamako has survived the largest attack in the last five years - and Moscow rushed to make use of the situation. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, a coordinated "coup attempt" was foiled with help from Russian forces, together with Malian security structures. Not all analysts agree with that interpretation.

On Saturday, a paramilitary assault on at least four cities at once - including the international airport in Bamako, the city of Kati, and the northern centres of Kidal and Sevare - according to official estimates affected around 12,000 people, with "sophisticated weapons" in play. Al-Qaeda-linked militants and the separatist Azawad Liberation Front claimed responsibility.

The Malian defence minister, General Sadio Camara, was killed in the attacks. That makes the case the biggest diplomatic problem for the junta of Assimi Goita, which has controlled the country since the 2020 coup. The same Goita who today is posing with Russian ambassador Igor Gromyko in Bamako and publishing photos from "a meeting with a Russian delegation" - went silent for three days after the attack.

Control over the attacked territories and the exact number of casualties are still not known. Residents of Bamako describe "tense air", fear for safety, and a lack of clear information from the government.

For Moscow this is a golden opportunity. Northwest Africa - Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger - entered the regime of open Russian influence in 2023 after a string of coups. French forces have been pushed out, the Russian "Africa Corps" (the successor to "Wagner") became the main security partner of the juntas. Now that the region is showing signs of instability, Moscow is presenting itself as the "stabiliser".

The question is simple - is this really a foiled coup, or just a Russian interpretation of a military situation on the ground that is still not under control? The history of Soviet and then Russian propaganda has taught us that behind a "foiled attack" you often find "an attack we did not see coming" or "a defeat we did not sabotage".

For the Balkans, Africa is not distant. The Mali crises share a common code with the crises our institutions have - weak state structures, outside players who fill the empty space, local politicians playing everyone against everyone. The only difference is that we have more water and fewer guns.