When Russian President Vladimir Putin talks about „the end of the war in Ukraine", he does so with the tone of a man who already has the victory in hand. The reality, as most experts analyse it, is different. The Kremlin has an internal problem that is starting to eat at it - and it doesn't come from the West.

It's the quiet erosion of the three pillars that prop up the regime: Russian nationalists, residents of annexed territories, and the middle class. The first two groups are ideologically locked in - they get a „won peace", a victorious narrative, and there's nowhere for disappointment to appear. The third group is the one the Kremlin has a problem with.

The middle class doesn't want „victory". It wants an average quality of life: uncensored access to the internet, a stable price for bread, the ability to travel, a son going to some normal university. All of that has crumbled in pieces over the last two years. Social networks are blocked, inflation has eaten savings, and Russian banks don't work like Western ones.

Analysts who follow the internal life of Moscow see the same pattern as in the late 1980s - the moment a system forgets that its own functionaries have wives, children and passports. Not a revolution. But an elite reconfiguration. Behind the façade of a „monolithic Kremlin" there are several factions, and they have started to position themselves for the post-Putin era. The question is „when", not „if".

What does that mean for reality? All the variants experts are looking at lead to the same outcome: a frozen conflict in Ukraine, not „unconditional surrender". Not because Moscow doesn't want more - but because it can't afford more. An endless war is expensive even for a country that claims energy sovereignty.

For the Balkans, this is an informative moment. A frozen conflict - that's the scenario our region lived with for 30 years. Bosnia, Kosovo, Cyprus. We know what it looks like. We know how expensive it is. And we know that „frozen" doesn't mean „finished" - it means „waiting".